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C o g n i t i v e  o p e r a t i o n s  a n d   
   p r o j e c t i o n  s p a c e s 1 
 
 
In recent years, Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier have popularized 
the theory of blending (or conceptual integration) as a widespread cog-
nitive mechanism which applies over many areas of conceptualization, 
including metaphor and metonymy. According to this theory, the under-
standing of some metaphorical expressions involves the activation of, at 
least, four different mental spaces: two input spaces (i.e. a source and a 
target space), a generic space, and a blend. Turner & Fauconnier con-
tend that in this process emergent structure may be created which is not 
present in any of the input spaces. Emergent structure is the result of a 
number of potential irregularities in the mapping process, such as the 
existence of asymmetries and non-correspondences between source and 
target. The present paper examines Turner & Fauconnier’s proposal 
carefully and argues that there are no irregularities in conceptual projec-
tion. In our view, purported irregularities are only apparent and may be 
explained away in terms of the activation and principled combination of 
partial source and target inputs which are projected and integrated into 
single composite source and target spaces. These composite spaces 
have all the structure necessary for the metaphorical cross-domain 
mapping to take place in such a way that there are no non-
correspondences or asymmetries between source and target. We also 
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argue that the default interpretation of expressions involving conceptual 
projection and integration is a matter of the activity of any of a number 
of cognitive operations such as correlation, contrast, domain expansion, 
domain reduction, strengthening, mitigation, saturation, and counterfac-
tual reasoning. Finally, in our alternative account, there is a projection 
space that is constructed on the basis of the conceptual structure result-
ing from such operations. This space is available for additional implica-
tive operations that are often needed to derive the ultimate value of ex-
pressions in context.  
     
Key words: mental space, blend, emergent structure, input space, con-





The question of conceptual interaction has been a relatively important area of 
interest in cognitive linguistics, especially in work carried out by Mark Turner 
and Gilles Fauconnier in relation to mental space theory and the notion of 
blending or conceptual integration (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 1996, 1998, 
2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995, 2000). However, some relevant aspects of 
mental space theory have been convincingly challenged in Ruiz de Mendoza 
(1996, 1998), in particular those connected with the apparent irregularities and 
asymmetries found in blended mental spaces. In this connection, we propose 
an alternative account that explains such irregularities and idiosyncrasies in 
terms of the activation and principled combination of multiple source and tar-
get input spaces. These are projected and integrated into single composite 
source and target spaces that thus become available for metaphoric, meto-
nymic or other related cognitive operations. As complementary to this pro-
posal, we take up previous work on conceptual interaction patterns carried out 
by Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) and examine their role in projection tasks. 
Since interaction patterns place constraints on conceptual projection and inte-
gration, they need to be taken into account by mental space theory. However, 
interaction patterns are only one kind of constraint on conceptual projection. 
They allow us to know about interaction possibilities but they reveal nothing 
about the kinds of cognitive operation which underlie the projection and inte-
gration of conceptual structure from different mental spaces. So we will also 
address the issue of how such operations govern the flow of information into 




1. Mental spaces and blending 
 
A mental space is a small conceptual packet built up provisionally for the 
purpose of performing certain cognitive operations (Fauconnier & Turner, 
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1996: 113). It must be noted that a mental space is a dynamic construct that 
derives its structure from a non-dynamic conceptual repository. In this respect 
it differs from the notion of ‘idealized cognitive model’ -put forward by La-
koff (1987) and widely accepted nowadays in the cognitive linguistics com-
munity- which is used to refer to different forms of conventional knowledge 
such as Fillmore’s (1985) frames (conceptual structures with processes, roles, 
and participants), Johnson’s (1987) image-schemas (such as the notions of 
‘container’ and ‘path’), metaphor, and metonymy (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). In fact, some metal spaces (like metaphoric inputs) import their struc-
ture from frames or image-schemas, while others (like blends) are the result of 
an integration process, like the one triggered off by a metaphoric or a meto-
nymic mapping. 
 
Blending theory is a theory of conceptual projection and integration of 
mental spaces. In metaphor processing and production, it is proposed that 
there are usually four mental spaces involved. Two of them, which would 
roughly correspond to the traditional source and target domains of Lakoff & 
Johnson’s (1980) metaphor theory, are called INPUT SPACES. Input spaces 
have elements that correlate on the basis of the generic structure that they 
have in common and which constitutes a GENERIC SPACE. There is a fourth 
space, the BLENDED SPACE or BLEND, which derives its structure from the cor-
related inputs. Blends exploit and develop counterpart connections between 
input spaces and in so doing integrate simple related events into more com-
plex events. Blends are dynamic (during blending conceptual work involving 
the activation of new spaces and the modification of previously activated ones 
may be required) and they may have structure which is not provided by the 
input spaces. In fact, they may even contain emergent structure inconsistent 























Figure 1. Turner & Fauconnier’s four-space model. 
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By way of illustration of how this model works, consider the following ex-
ample, taken from Fauconnier & Turner (2001). In it, a clipper, Great Amer-
ica, which currently sails from San Francisco to Boston, is involved in an 
imaginary race against the Northern Light, which did the same journey in 
1953. In order to understand this situation, we need to combine the following 
mental spaces: one input space for the passage of the Northern Light in 1953; 
another for the passage of the present run by the Great America; a generic 
space, which extracts structure common to the two input spaces (i.e. a ship 
makes a journey of a certain duration from a source to a destination); and the 
blended space into which the Northern Light and the Great America are pro-
jected as taking part in a race. The blended space has emergent structure that 
does not exist in any of the input spaces, where there is no competition be-
tween two ships, but only two separate journeys carried out on different dates. 
 
A different but comparable situation is provided by the analysis of the ex-
pression You could see the smoke coming out of his ears (Turner & Faucon-
nier 2000: 136). In terms of Turner & Fauconnier’s analysis, if we postulate a 
cross-domain mapping in which the source consists of a container (typically a 
pot or a kettle) with boiling water and the target a person’s head, there arise 
some inconsistencies: boiling water gives off steam, not smoke, which is natu-
rally released through an opening which, unlike the ears, is not found on the 
sides of the container. The natural solution for Turner & Fauconnier is to 
think of the blend as inheriting part of its structure from the source input and 
part from the target input, while it also has emergent structure which is pro-
duced by the blend itself.  
 
 
2. The combined input hypothesis 
 
The existence of emergent structure and of non-correspondences is a peculiar 
feature of blends in Turner & Fauconnier’s proposal. However, this hypothe-
sis, which we shall call the emergent structure hypothesis, has been ques-
tioned by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996, 1998) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez 
(2002). These authors give alternative accounts of some of Turner & Faucon-
nier’s best-known examples of metaphor in terms of the activation of multiple 
source inputs which, after being combined and integrated into one single 
source, correlate with relevant elements of the metaphoric target. We shall 
refer to Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez’s proposal as the combined input hypothe-
sis.  
 
In order to show the explanatory power of the combined input hypothesis, 
we shall consider again the example of the race between the Northern Light 
and the Great America. Under this hypothesis, the race frame is not created by 
the blend, but derived from pre-existing, already available knowledge about 
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races, i.e. from an extra input space, and, if this is correct, a revision of their 
explanation is required. In this alternative view, the Northern Light vs. Great 
America example requires the activation of three input spaces: one containing 
the journey of the Northern Light; a second one providing a characterization 
of the journey of the Great America; and the third one supplying information 
about races. Once the two clippers have been assigned the racers’ role in the 
projection space (the blend in the standard four-domain model), whatever the 
two clippers do will have to accord with the conceptual structure of the do-
main of races. This situation may be represented in figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Imaginary race between the Northern Light and the Great America 
 
Let us now go back to the sentence You could see the smoke coming out of 
his ears. We analyze this example in terms of the activation of two combin-
able source inputs: one selects its structure from the container image-schema; 
in the other there is a burning object or substance (e.g. firewood) which pro-
duces smoke. The target input has a very angry person. External signs of an-
ger (sweat, redness) in the target correlate with external signs of combustion 
inside the container (smoke, heat) in the composite source. Figure 3 below 
captures the essentials of this process. 
 
In the combined input hypothesis the presence of more than one combin-
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that one single source is able to provide all the structure needed to correlate all 
relevant elements of the metaphoric source and target. Let us consider in this 
regard Grady, Oakley & Coulson’s (1999: 103) discussion of the metaphor 
This surgeon is a butcher, which a faithful application of what we have la-
beled the emergent structure hypothesis. According to Grady, Oakley & Coul-
son (1999), Lakoff’s traditional two-domain model of metaphor would give 
an account of this expression in terms of direct projection from the source 
domain of butchery to the target domain of surgery. This projection would be 
guided by a number of counterpart mappings: from ‘butcher’ onto ‘surgeon’, 
from ‘animal’ onto ‘human being’, from ‘commodity’ onto ‘patient’, from 
‘cleaver’ onto ‘scalpel’, among others. However, these authors believe that 
there is a crucial meaning element that is eluded in the traditional analysis: the 
suggestion that the surgeon is incompetent. In their view, this notion is not 
projected from the source to the target, since butchers are typically competent 
at what they do. Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999) conclude that the idea 
that the surgeon is incompetent is emergent structure, peculiar to the blend, 
which results from contrasts between surgeons and butchers, a factor that goes 
beyond a cross-domain mapping. Thus, the blend combines the surgeon’s goal 
of healing his patients with the butcher’s means of achieving his own goal of 
cutting flesh. The blend does not import either the butcher’s goals or the sur-
geon’s conventional means of performing surgery. 
 
  
Figure 3. Conceptual interaction in You could see the smoke coming out of his ears 
contents  
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The problem with this analysis is that it makes the strong claim that in the 
blend there is actual integration of conceptual elements from the source and 
target. However, such integration would involve an interpretation of This sur-
geon is a butcher in which the surgeon, in doing surgery, actually performs 
the same movements as a butcher cutting up an animal. If there is no actual 
integration of elements but only correlation and contrast, we can make the 
weaker but more plausible claim that there is only similarity between the way 
a butcher and the surgeon work. Thus, we think of the surgeon using his scal-
pel in a careless or clumsy way; a comparable way of using the cleaver is not 
careless in a butcher’s activity, since much less accuracy is required. In any 
case, the idea that the surgeon in this metaphor is incompetent is not emergent 
structure any more than other implications that follow naturally from the cor-
relation and consequent comparison of the metaphorical elements in corre-
spondence. For example, another implication of the metaphor concerns the 
probable poor state of the patient after the figurative butchery; and still an-
other is the surgeon’s lack of concern for or perhaps his unawareness of his 
own incompetence. These observations lead us to conclude that while it is 
correct to state that the blend has emergent structure (i.e. new structure arising 
from correlation and contrast), it is not accurate to maintain that this structure 
is the result of integrating non-corresponding elements. 
 
It must be observed that integration in the combined input hypothesis is 
limited to cases of multiple source or target domains. In examples like the 
surgeon-butcher metaphor there is no integration but only correlation and con-
trast. We see some of the characteristics of one domain in terms of some of 
the characteristics of another domain. This allows us to derive meaning impli-
cations that are projected into the blend. The blend is thus the repository not 
only for explicit but also for implicit knowledge. This issue will be addressed 
in some more detail in section 5 below. 
 
To sum up, the difference between the two conceptual projection hypothe-
ses is evident from the comparison between the standard model as represented 
in figure 1 above and the diagram in figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4. Combined input hypothesis 
 
 
The combined input hypothesis preserves some of the most relevant char-
acteristics of Turner & Fauconnier’s account. Thus it retains the notion of 
‘mental space’ as a dynamic construct which derives its structure from an ide-
alized cognitive model or from other mental spaces. It also retains the basic 
correlational structure between source and target inputs and the notion of ge-
neric space as a mental space containing generic structure abstracted away 
from source and target. Finally, it makes use of the notions of ‘projection’ and 
‘integration’ as two crucial cognitive operations involved in conceptual inter-
action. However, there are a number of significant differences between our 
own account and Turner & Fauconnier’s. We make the following claims: 
 
• The label “blend” may not be retained. It is more accurate to use the 
alternative term “projection space”. Unlike a blended space or blend, 
a projection space is the result of ongoing cognitive activity, not the 
creator of such an activity. 
• Projection spaces (i.e. the counterpart of Turner & Fauconnier’s 
blends) do not contain structure inconsistent with the structure pro-
jected from the input spaces. The apparent existence of emergent 
structure is explained in terms of the activation of multiple concep-
tual spaces that interact according to a range of possible operations 
and constraints.  
• Projection spaces are not dynamic in the sense that Turner & Fau-
connier postulate for blends, i.e. by being able to create their own 
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put spaces. Instead, we consider projection spaces to be the outcome 
of previous cognitive activity.  
• Cognitive operations like integration, correlation, and contrast play a 
prominent role in regulating the outcome of the projection process. 
Other operations are also considered (see section 3 below): domain 
expansion, domain reduction, strengthening, mitigation, completion, 
counterfactual conditioning, and probably others. 
• Conceptual projection is also constrained by conceptual interaction 
patterns (see section 4 below). 
• Projection spaces may become inputs for further conceptual projec-
tion operations, as in implicature derivation processes (see section 5 
below). These operations abide by all the constraints indicated 
above. 
 
There are, in our view, three clear advantages of the combined input hypothe-
sis over the emergent structure hypothesis. One is that there is no need in it to 
postulate the existence of non-correspondences or inconsistencies in the corre-
lational structure of the metaphor. Another is that a projection space is, in 
consonance with the nature of other mental spaces, the result of cognitive ac-
tivity and not the producer of such activity. The third one is that the opera-
tions of correlation and integration are assigned their proper places: in the 
combined input hypothesis, correlation takes place before conceptual structure 
is integrated into the projection space; in the emergent structure hypothesis, 
correlation is partly a matter of the blend, as the result of an irregular projec-
tion system.  
 
From our discussion so far, it will have become evident that the notion of 
‘cognitive operation’ plays a central role in the creation of projection spaces. 
In what follows we shall examine in greater detail the implications of this no-
tion for our account. 
 
 
3. Cognitive operations 
 
By a cognitive operation we mean a mental mechanism whose purpose is to 
derive a semantic representation out of a linguistic expression (or of other 
symbolic device, such as a drawing) in order to make it meaningful in the 
context in which it is to be interpreted. Here a brief terminological digression 
may be in order. The terms COGNITIVE and CONCEPTUAL sometimes seem to 
be used rather interchangeably in cognitive linguistics. For example, many 
cognitive linguists would accept to use CONCEPTUAL MECHANISMS as syn-
onymous with COGNITIVE MECHANISMS. However, it may be wise to reserve 
the term COGNITIVE to refer to mental processes and the term CONCEPTUAL to 
talk about the outcome of such processes. Thus, it should be preferable to 
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speak of conceptual interaction, if our focus is on the different interaction pat-
terns that emerge out of cognitive activity. By the same token, it would be 
more appropriate to talk about COGNITIVE MECHANISMS to underscore their 
dynamic nature. The notion of COGNITIVE MODEL, first proposed by Lakoff 
(1987), was conceived as having both a processual and a resultative aspect. As 
an organizing principle (e.g. a metaphoric mapping), it has a dynamic nature. 
In this case, the term COGNITIVE MODEL would seem to be more felicitous. On 
the other hand, a cognitive model is often seen as the result of the activity of 
an organizing principle (e.g. a metaphor). It may be suggested that the term 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL may be used in the latter case.  
 
Metaphoric and metonymic mappings seem to be clear cases of cognitive 
operations. However, saying that a mapping is a cognitive operation, although 
correct, is an oversimplification. Let us see why. A cognitive mapping is de-
fined as a set of correspondences between two (conceptual) domains. In meta-
phor the mapping is carried out across discrete conceptual domains; in meton-
ymy, the mapping is internal to one domain, i.e. there is a domain-subdomain 
relationship where a subdomain may map onto the domain it belongs to or, 
conversely, a domain may be mapped onto one of its subdomains. The fact 
that metaphoric mappings are domain-external and metonymies are domain-
internal has important consequences in terms of the kinds of cognitive opera-
tion that support the mapping.  
 
 
3.1. Correlation and contrast 
 
Metaphors may be classified from various perspectives, such as the ontologi-
cal nature of the domains involved, their degree of genericity, the complexity 
of the metaphoric operation, the number of correspondences in the mapping, 
and the nature of the correspondence between source and target. The typo-
logical issue has been addressed in some detail in Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal 
(2002: 43-50). Here we are only concerned with the last of the perspectives 
mentioned above. In this connection, Grady (1999) has distinguished between 
CORRELATIONAL and RESEMBLANCE metaphors. The former involve a corre-
lation between different but naturally co-occurring dimensions of experience, 
as in CONSCIOUS IS UP/UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN (e.g. Get up, He fell asleep, He 
sank into a coma), which correlates the experience of humans (and most 
mammals) rising up when they awake and lying down when they go to sleep. 
The latter take place when source and target have comparable attributes, as in 
John is a lion, where we think of John as having the same kind of instinctual 
courage and fierceness which we observe in lions.  
 
The previous examples have allowed us to see that comparing and correlat-
ing are different forms of cognitive operation which underlie metaphoric map-
pings. In our view, these two operations may combine to yield a complex 
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range of meaning implications. Consider the metaphor Journalists dug up 
some interesting facts. In it we see the discovery of unknown information by 
journalists in terms of diggers finding hidden objects (typically treasures or 
archeological remains) by removing them from the ground. Journalism and 
treasure-hunting have enough features in common to license the metaphor 
INVESTIGATING (A PROBLEM) IS EXPLORING (A LANDSCAPE). But in our ex-
ample, this metaphor works in combination with the correlational metaphor 
KNOWING IS SEEING, which is based on the primary experience of getting in-
formation through vision (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 54). The combination of 
the two metaphors allows us to derive the implication that, just as an object 
which is taken out of the ground becomes accessible to visual inspection and 
therefore to intellectual apprehension, whatever the journalists have been able 
to reveal is now available for other people to know. 
 
 
3.2. Expansion and reduction 
 
Generally, metaphoric mappings work on the basis of many correspondences, 
although some metaphors only seem to exploit one correspondence, as in My 
tender rose abandoned me, where only one relevant attribute of roses (i.e. the 
kind of feelings it evokes by virtue of its beauty, scent, and color) is at work 
in the mapping from plant to person. Metonymic mappings are also based 
upon one correspondence. In this case, this is the consequence of the domain-
subdomain relationship that is definitional of metonymies. Thus, it would be 
impossible to map more than one element of a subdomain onto the domain to 
which it belongs, or conversely to map a whole domain onto more than one of 
its subdomains. In this view, one of the domains involved in a metonymic 
mapping acts as a MATRIX DOMAIN for all the subdomains which depend on it. 
The term “matrix” captures the two crucial ideas of structured dependency 
and primariness that characterize domain-subdomains relationships. Thus, in 
The child broke the window, ‘window’, the matrix domain, maps onto ‘win-
dow pane’ (one of its subdomains). In He gave me a hand, ‘hand’ maps onto 
‘help (as if with the hand)’, where ‘hand’ is an instrumental notion within the 
domain of ‘help’; as such, ‘hand’ is a subdomain of the matrix domain ‘help’. 
 
The two kinds of metonymic relationship between a matrix domain and its 
subdomains have allowed Ruiz de Mendoza (1997, 2000) to make a distinc-
tion between SOURCE-IN-TARGET and TARGET-IN-SOURCE metonymies. In the 
former the source is a subdomain of the target, while in the latter it is the tar-
get that is a subdomain of the source. The distinction might at first sight seem 
inconsequential, but it is easy to see that this is not the case once we examine 
the different cognitive and communicative roles assigned to each of the two 
choices.  
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Consider again the target-in-source mapping from ‘window’ to ‘window 
pane’. The role of this mapping is to bring into focus that part of the matrix 
domain that is relevant for interpretation. By highlighting this relevant domain 
we perform a cognitive operation which results in the reduction of the concep-
tual domain involved in the metonymy. Conceptual reduction by highlighting 
is an economical operation for the speaker: it is the addressee’s task to deter-
mine the relevant subdomain. The economy of this kind of metonymy is evi-
dent from a sentence like Marlboro has decided to challenge the new anti-
smoking campaign, where it is difficult to pin down the right target with accu-
racy. Thus, it is completely unnecessary for both speaker and addressee to 
know who is actually responsible for the policy of Marlboro in relation to the 
anti-smoking campaign. It is enough to assume that the decision has been 
made by someone who has the authority or the responsibility to do so. In fact, 
it would be fairly unnatural, even cumbersome, for the speaker to use a longer 
description like “the person or persons in charge of dealing with anti-smoking 
campaigns”. In much the same way, it would be unusual in many contexts to 
be explicit as to what part of the window has been broken if it is the window 
pane that we are referring to (cf. The child broke the window pane), rather 
than other parts of a window like the frame (cf. They even had to break the 
window frame to make their way into the house). Note that the pane is the 
most prominent and breakable part of a window, which makes this element 
the easiest to access by means of metonymy.  
 
Now think of the mapping from ‘hand’ to ‘help provided as if with the 
hands’. What we have here is domain expansion, a cognitive mechanism by 
means of which a subdomain is developed into its corresponding matrix do-
main. This cognitive operation is the exact reverse of domain reduction. Thus, 
while domain highlighting reduces the semantic scope of a conceptual repre-
sentation, domain development gives rise to an expanded conceptual domain. 
Like reduction operations, domain expansion is economical for the speaker 
too, but for a different reason. Here the speaker works by providing limited 
information under the assumption that it will be developed by the hearer into 
the relevant conceptual representation. It is also economical for the hearer 
since it is his task to determine the actual scope of the resulting domain in 
such a way that potentially non-relevant material is left out. 
 
  
3.3. Completion or saturation 
 
Utterances may have incomplete and expanded versions. The context of situa-
tion provides us with the conceptual material that is used to expand an utter-
ance into a fully interpretable form. For example, the utterance John’s not 
good enough demands completion in such a way that it is specified what it is 
that John is not good for (e.g. John’s not good enough for an executive posi-
tion). Completion operations have been studied in the pragmatics literature 
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under different labels. Bach (1994) uses the label “completion”, but Sperber 
& Wilson (1986) deal with this phenomenon as another form of enrichment, 
while Récanati (1989) favors the label “saturation”. Completion is not to be 
confused with what we have called domain expansion. The former is a gram-
matical phenomenon: there are some constructions (e.g. be good for, be 
enough for, be ready for, be ready to, finish +ing) which can dispense with 
the prepositional object. If not present in the expression, the prepositional ob-
ject has to be supplied from the context for the utterance to be interpreted. 
Domain expansion, on the other hand, is not a constructional problem but a 
purely conceptual one where part of a domain stands for the whole matrix 
domain to which it belongs. 
 
 
3.4. Mitigation  
 
Let us now think of scalar concepts like height or weight. If taken literally, the 
sentence John is as tall as a mountain describes a factual impossibility. How-
ever, in a non-literal interpretation we understand that what is meant is that 
John is extremely tall, so much so that we feel impressed. John is as tall as a 
mountain is actually a hyperbolic expression, an exaggeration that is intended 
to be evident to the addressee. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the 
semantic impact of this hyperbolic statement is the result of a cognitive map-
ping from mountains to people. We understand the impressiveness of John’s 
tallness in terms of the impressiveness of the height of a mountain. However, 
this mapping is different from most parallel metaphoric mappings. Thus, in 
John is a lion, where we see a form of human behavior in terms of corre-
sponding animal behavior, it is possible to think of John’s courage as rivaling 
or at least equaling a lion’s attributed courage. This is not the case in John is 
as tall as a mountain. A human being and a mountain could not possibly have 
the same size. There is a clash in the topological structure of the two domains, 
which needs to be solved. So, after the mapping operation takes place, it is 
necessary to carry out a mitigation operation that adapts the scalar notion of 
height to human standards.  
 
In general, hyperbolic statements require mitigation operations. Thus the 
predicate in This suitcase weighs tons, as uttered by a person who has to carry 
the weight, is to be mitigated into ‘a lot’. However, mitigation is not, of itself, 
enough to understand the meaning implications involved in this sentence. 
There is a previous mapping from extremely heavy things (i.e. objects which 
actually weigh tons) to heavy suitcases (i.e. which may weigh a few pounds). 
In the mapping, we see the physical and psychological effects of the weight of 
the suitcase on the protagonist (i.e. the person who has to carry its actual 
weight) in terms of the effects that we believe would be caused by an object 
which weighs several tons (frustration, anger, impotence, among others).  
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Scalar concepts are not only amenable to mitigation but also to the converse 
operation, which may be called strengthening or reinforcement. Sperber & 
Wilson (1986) have already identified this cognitive operation under the label 
of “enrichment” in the context of inferential pragmatics. For them, enrichment 
is one of the tasks which, together with linguistic decoding operations, allow 
to derive a form of pragmatic inference called explicatures or explicitly com-
municated assumptions (see Ruiz de Mendoza, 2002, and Ruiz de Mendoza & 
Pérez, 2002, for a detailed discussion of the compatibility of this aspect of 
relevance theory with cognitive semantics). Sperber & Wilson discuss truistic 
and vague expressions like some time and some distance in sentences like It 
will take some time to repair your car, sir or The park is some distance from 
here. In principle, “some time” and “some distance” may refer to any stretch 
of time or space. But in some contexts the former will mean ‘a (fairly) long 
time’ and the latter ‘a (fairly) long distance’. For example, if a person takes 
his car to be repaired and he is warned that it will take “some time” to do his 
car, he will have to assume that the repair work will be considerably longer 
than she expected. For Sperber & Wilson this kind of inference is a develop-
ment of the blueprint provided by the linguistic expression and it is obtained 
through enrichment. An enriched representation contains the same informa-
tion and more than the initial representation. Récanati (1989) uses the label 
“strengthening” to refer to the same phenomenon. 
 
 
3.6. Counterfactual operations 
 
Let us now consider the following expression, discussed by Turner & Fau-
connier (2002: 470) in the context of blending theory: 
 
(1) If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink. 
 
The context for this sentence is the time when President Clinton seemed to 
be surviving political damage from a number of sexual scandals and the film 
Titanic was popular. For Turner & Fauconnier, there is a partial cross-space 
mapping between two input spaces: one features President Clinton and his 
scandals; in the other, the purportedly unsinkable Titanic hits an iceberg and 
sinks. Clinton is the counterpart of the Titanic and the scandals are the coun-
terpart of the iceberg. Then, there is a blended space where Clinton is the Ti-
tanic and the scandals are the iceberg. The blend draws part of its structure 
from the Titanic input space (the source, where there is a voyage by the Ti-
tanic which runs into something enormous in the water) and part from the 
Clinton input space (the target, which provided the blend with its causal and 
event shape structure). In the blend, the Titanic is unsinkable after all and it is 
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possible for ice to sink. These inferences do not come from the source, where 
the Titanic does sink, or from the target, where Clinton merely seems to be 
surviving the scandals. In the blend, instead, the scandal-iceberg is the great-
est conceivable threat and the Clinton-Titanic survives even this kind of 
threat. This structure is, according to Turner & Fauconnier, constructed in the 
blend and projected back to the target input to reframe it and give it new and 
clearer inferences. 
 
The Clinton-Titanic example is a case of counterfactual statement. Coun-
terfactuals are usually equated with conditional statements that have a false 
antecedent. However, not all conditionals of this kind are true counterfactuals. 
Thus, the sentence If I had been born a woman, I’d hate short skirts is an im-
possible conditional since I was born a man. But the false situation described 
in the antecedent is conceivable: people can be born male or female. Or think 
of Lewis’s (1973) well-known example If kangaroos had no tails, they would 
topple over. We know that kangaroos have tails but it would not be impossible 
to conceive of a situation in which kangaroos have no tails (think of malfor-
mations). These conditionals spring from an implication whose reason we can 
understand, not from imagining an alternative world. Conditionals of this type 
contrast with what we may call a true counterfactual, like the Clinton-Titanic 
example, in two ways:  
 
(i) In a true counterfactual, the antecedent (protasis) is not only impos-
sible but also unconceivable (i.e. Clinton could not possibly be the Ti-
tanic); in fact it has a metaphoric element in it, i.e. we are required to 
map the event of the Titanic hitting the iceberg onto the situation in 
which Clinton is faced with one scandal after another.  
(ii) In a true counterfactual, the consequent (apodosis) describes an im-
possible situation or event (e.g. sinking ice). This is not necessarily the 
case in an impossible conditional, where the consequent may be true or 
not. For example, in If I had been born a woman, I’d hate short skirts, 
we do not know if the speaker would actually have hated skirts had he 
been born a woman. 
 
It may be observed that there are limiting cases of impossible conditional 
like If I had been born a cat, I’d hate cat’s food, which partially resemble 
pure counterfactuals. In this example, it would be a matter of controversy 
whether it is possible or impossible for a person to be born a cat (this will 
even depend on cultural beliefs like reincarnation). However, this possibility 
or impossibility is immaterial to the extent that there is no metaphoric element 
in the protasis and the apodosis does not describe something impossible. 
 
Since counterfactuals are essentially figurative, it should not be surprising 
to find that they share a number of relevant properties with hyperbole. Thus, 
while sometimes hyperbole describes possible-though highly unlikely-states 
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of affairs, it will usually present the hearer with an impossible state of affairs 
(except in a fictional world). In effect, it is possible to conceive a suitcase that 
weighs tons. Think of a giant suitcase specially made with the purpose of 
breaking a record for the Guinness. However, it is impossible to find a man 
that is literally as tall as mountain. In both cases, a hyperbole communicates a 
situation or a state of excess that either bothers or impresses the speaker. 
Counterfactuals are evident impossibilities intended to create in the hearer 
basically the same effects. Thus, in the Clinton-Titanic example, the speaker 
expresses his astonishment at Clinton’s ability to survive an extremely diffi-
cult situation. Interestingly enough, the difficult situation itself is seen in 
terms of an impossible situation (it may be possible to survive a series of con-
secutive scandals but it would have been impossible for the Titanic to sink the 
iceberg). The hyperbolic effect is derived from this mapping from impossible 
to hardly likely. It is because of this mapping that it is possible to consider 
counterfactuals as extreme cases of hyperbole.  
 
There are also differences. Hyperbole is based upon single scalar concepts 
(‘weight’, ‘size’, ‘height’, etc.) and counterfactuals on situations. In fact, 
counterfactual statements are constructed on the basis of what Ruiz de Men-
doza & Otal (2002: 82) have called situational metonymies, where an espe-
cially relevant episode within a situational or eventive frame stands for the 
whole frame. In the Clinton-Titanic example, two situations are accessed 
metonymically: one, in which Clinton is beset by sexual scandals; another, in 
which the Titanic hits an iceberg and sinks, against all predictions, with the 
result of the horrible loss of much human life. 
 
 
4. Interaction patterns 
 
Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) distinguish between interaction based upon 
metaphor-metonymy combinations and interaction based upon combinations 
of other models (e.g. propositional structures and image-schemas). In this sec-
tion, we shall give a brief outline of the different combinations of cognitive 
models and their motivation. In our view, such combinations place prelimi-
nary constraints upon conceptual projection tasks. 
 
One crucial observation made by Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez is that, in cases 
of conceptual interaction between models with different degrees of genericity, 
the most generic model provides the blueprint for the activation and integra-
tion of other less generic models. For example, in such expressions as She’s in 
trouble, We’re out of trouble now, and He went into trouble, the concept 
‘trouble’, which is endowed with a negative axiology, is seen in terms of a 
CONTAINER image-schema, i.e. as a bounded region in space. Once inside this 
figurative bounded region the protagonist is affected by the conditions pre-
vailing inside it. If able to get out of it, the container will no longer have any 
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effect on the protagonist (see Peña 1997, for a detailed study of structure and 
logic of this image schema). In each of these three examples, the protagonist 
interacts with the CONTAINER schema by becoming part of its structure and 
logic.  
 
As Peña (1999a, b, 2002) has studied in detail, some image-schemas are 
more basic than others that are subsidiary to the former. When a subsidiary 
schema interacts with a basic schema, the former is built into the structure and 
logic of the latter. For example, take the expression We have had our ups and 
downs, as uttered by two lovers who find themselves at a point where they 
feel they have made progress in their relationship in spite of difficulties. The 
most crucial aspects of the meaning of this expression are accounted for in 
terms of the interaction between the PATH and VERTICALITY image-schemas. 
The PATH schema is the embedding schema which accounts for the context 
specified above. It licenses the activation of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor 
(cf. Lakoff, 1993), in which lovers are seen as travelers, the love relationship 
as the vehicle, difficulties in the relationship as impediments to travel, and the 
lovers’ common goals as the travelers’ common destination. The VERTICAL-
ITY schema associates higher positions with vantage points and is thus en-
dowed with a positive axiological load, whereas lower positions are negative 
(cf. Krzeszowski, 1993). Within the context of the lovers’ figurative journey 
along a path, the ups and downs map respectively onto good and bad moments 
in the love relationship. In this sense, the VERTICALITY schema becomes part 
of the structure and logic of the PATH schema: journeys can have good and 
bad moments just as love relationships.  
 
The principle of interaction we have just presented has an important role to 
play in the creation of combined spaces. A clear case is our discussion of the 
sentence You could see the smoke coming out of his ears (figure 3 above), 
where inputy (the burning substance which gives off smoke and heat) be-
comes part of inputx (the container) and not the other way around. Another 
clear case is provided by the imaginary race between the Northern Light and 
the Great America. Here we have two levels of integration: one in which the 
two journeys are combined into one, thus yielding a combined target input; 
another in which the source input provides the structure (i.e. a ship race) to 
see the Northern Light and the Great America as competing in the projection 
space.  
 
Metaphor and metonymy are, in their turn, a fruitful source of interaction 
possibilities. These have been exhaustively investigated in Ruiz de Mendoza 
& Díez (2002). Here we provide just a brief overview with minor refinements 
oriented toward the explanation of their role in conceptual projection tasks. 
There are four main patterns each of which may have a number of variants or 
subsidiary patterns: (i) metonymic expansion of (part of) a metaphoric source 
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input; (ii) metonymic reduction of (part of) a metaphoric source input; (iii) 
metonymic expansion of (part of) a metaphoric target input; (iv) metonymic 
reduction of (part of) a metaphoric target input. These patterns are represented 
in figures 5 to 8 below. 
 
 





Figure 5. Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source 
 
 























Figure 8. Metonymic reduction of a metaphoric target 
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In order to illustrate the first possibility, i.e. metonymic expansion of the 
metaphoric source in terms of the combined input hypothesis, let us discuss 
the expression beat one’s breast. Goossens (1990) has aptly studied this and 
similar body-part expressions (e.g. speak with one’s tongue in one’s cheek, be 
closed-lipped) as cases of metaphor derived from metonymy. In Goossen’s 
view, the metonymic basis of beat one’s breast (‘make an open show of sor-
row that may be partly pretence’) is the religious practice of beating one’s 
breast when one confesses one’s sins publicly. However, rather than a meta-
phor with a metonymic basis, what we have is an expansion operation of the 
source domain of a metaphor. What is said (i.e. that someone hit his breast 
repeatedly) provides a point of access to a broader concept (i.e. the scene in 
which breast beating is performed with the purpose of showing publicly that 
one is sorrowful about one’s mistakes). The broader concept then maps onto 
particular situations that have common structure. Consider in this regard the 
semantic implications of the sentence He held a press conference to publicly 
beat his breast about his marital infidelity in a context in which a politician 
wants to show repentance for his immorality in order to avert negative elec-
toral consequences. There is no actual breast beating, only public confession, 
but carried out in such a way that it is not believed to be genuine. For this in-
terpretation to take place, it is necessary to develop the source input meto-
nymically in such a way that we have in it not only the action of a sinner beat-
ing his breast, but also the stereotypical knowledge associated with this ac-
tion, i.e. that it is carried out as a way of showing genuineness and of moving 
God to mercy. The target in turn integrates the politician’s observable actions 
with knowledge about infidelity and its consequences in connection with the 
context (the expected public opinion reaction). The elements of the expanded 
source input correlate with the combined target input in which we have a poli-
tician acting out his feelings in public in order to show true repentance and 
move his voters to forgiveness. From this correlation arises the idea that the 
politician pretends his sorrow in an attempt to appease his voters and avoid 
some kind of electoral punishment. This information is received by the projec-
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Figure 9. He beat his breast about his marital infidelity 
 
 
The second interaction pattern, metonymic reduction of a metaphoric 
source, is illustrated by the sentence She’s my heart and my soul, where the 
speaker’s heart and soul stand metonymically for a subdomain of them, i.e. 
the deep emotions they figuratively contain. It is these emotions that get 
metaphorically mapped onto the protagonist who is thus envisaged as the 
main source of such emotions for the speaker.  
 
By way of illustration of the third interaction pattern, i.e. metonymic ex-
pansion of a metaphoric target, consider the expression The singer was given 
a big hand after her performance. At one stage ‘give a big hand’ is a meta-
phor whose target domain contains a metonymy: ‘(big) hand’ stands for 
‘(loud) applause’ or ‘(loud/enthusiastic) clapping of the hands’ (i.e. the in-
strument stands for the action) in the metaphor ‘give applause’ where an ac-
tion is envisaged as a transfer of possession (see Lakoff, 1993, for an account 
of this kind of metaphor). At another stage, there is a metonymy in which part 
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of an event (i.e. clapping hands) stands for the whole event (i.e. the audience 
clap their hands after the performance to express enjoyment or appreciation)2. 
Note that the fact that the idea of enjoyment is part of the explicated meaning 
of “give a big hand” is evident from the incongruity of the following adapta-
tion of the utterance under analysis: 
 
(2) ??The singer was given a big hand after the show because nobody 
really liked her performance. 
 
Finally, the fourth interaction pattern, metonymic reduction of a meta-
phoric target, is illustrated by the sentence He finally won her heart. In it we 
have a metaphor from the domain of competition or contest-which involves 
prize winning after beating the opponents-onto the domain of courtship -
which involves taking control of the loved one’s emotions by persuasion and 
other related strategies, and often defeating other potential lovers. In this 
metaphor, the target has a built-in metonymy from ‘heart’ (the lover’s “prize”) 
to ‘love’.  
 
What metonymy has in common in all the above examples is the fact that 
it is part of the architecture of the metaphor and not the other way around. As 
Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) have pointed out, this may be related to the 
very peculiar nature of metonymy as a domain-internal mapping in contrast to 
metaphor, which is domain external. However, there is at least one additional 
reason in that metonymy allows us either to expand or reduce the amount of 
conceptual material that is brought to bear upon processing. Thus, metonymy 
has a supporting role for metaphor either by allowing the interpreter to de-
velop a domain for all the correspondences of a mapping to take place ade-
quately (through domain expansion) or by directing the interpreter’s attention 
to the most significant part of a domain (through domain reduction). There is 
no comparable role for metaphor with respect to metonymy. 
 
Furthermore, the two cognitive functions of metonymy are paralleled by 
corresponding communicative functions. Contrast the cognitive and commu-
nicative processes illustrated in figures 1 and 2. In figure 1 we have two cases 
of domain expansion through metonymy, while figure 2 is a clear case of do-
main reduction. From the point of view of cognition, metonymies based on 
domain expansion are an economical way of providing access to as much 
                                                          
2 In fact, there is one further metaphor at work in this expression, i.e. IMPORTANT 
IS BIG (see Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 50). This metaphor allows us to conceptualize 
the intensity of the noise made by the audience clapping their hands (in the domain of 
action) in terms of the physical size of the object given (in the domain of transfer of 
possession). However, in being subsidiary to ACTIONS ARE TRANSFERS in the 
way specified, BIG IS IMPORTANT plays only a local role within the general deri-
vation process through conceptual mappings and does not call for a third stage in the 
explicature generation task. 
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conceptual material as is necessary by just invoking a significant part of the 
domain which contains all that material; on the other hand, metonymies based 
on reduction work by providing global access to a domain of which the ad-
dressee is to choose a relevant part. Note in this connection that in the first 
kind of metonymy access is not global, i.e. on the basis of part of a domain, 
the addressee has to single out the number and type of conceptual ingredients 
which will eventually be activated. From the point of view of the communica-
tive impact of both cognitive mechanisms, domain expansion is a way of pro-
viding the hearer with a rich amount of conceptual implications for very little 
processing effort. The hearer is responsible for the number of implications 
that will be derived, generally not more that needed for satisfactory interpreta-
tion in context. In conceptual interaction, this allows the hearer to develop a 
domain to the extent that it is ready for all necessary metaphoric correspon-
dences to be made, as in the first stage of interpretation of “give a big hand”, 
or for the full range of relevant implications worked out, as in the second 
stage of the same metaphor. Domain reduction, on the other hand, usually 
bases its communicative import on the relationship between the activation of a 
conceptual domain as a whole and the highlighting of one of its parts. Thus, in 
He finally won her heart, invoking the heart as the object of the lover’s goals 
conveys the idea that it is not simply love feelings but also the most central 
part of a person’s emotions that is at issue. 
 
 
5. Meaning implications 
 
As has already been noted above, the full meaning impact of a linguistic ex-
pression based on conceptual correlation and integration is to be calculated on 
the basis of the total range of meaning implications which the hearer is led to 
derive. Consider again the complex metaphor You could see the smoke coming 
out of his ears. Working out the meaning of this expression involves much 
more that simply seeing a certain angry person in terms of a container with 
burning contents. For example, smoke serves as a figurative indicator of in-
ternal combustion because of extreme heat. Real combustion generates con-
sumption of energy and materials. In a similar fashion, figurative combustion 
of a person involves the person being eventually deprived of energy and vital-
ity. That is why we can say that a person is being “consumed” with anger. 
This is just one out of several potential meaning implications of You could see 
the smoke coming out of his ears. There are at least two other such implica-
tions: 
 
• The person has lost control of his anger (i.e. the figurative fire has 
gone unchecked until the moment of the utterance being produced). 
• The person is potentially harmful for other people (in the same way 
that uncontrolled fire is dangerous). 
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These implications are independent of the context but need to be compatible 
with it.  
 
There is an important connection between this analysis and the question of 
explicature-generation mechanisms, which has been explored in some detail 
by Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez (2002). The no-
tion of EXPLICATURE was first put forward by Sperber & Wilson (1986) 
within Relevance Theory and is to be distinguished from the more traditional 
notion of IMPLICATURE within inferential pragmatics. For Sperber & Wilson 
(1986), a proposition is explicated rather than implicated if it is a development 
of the blueprint provided by the linguistic expression. Implicated propositions, 
on the other hand, are the result of a premise-conclusion calculation where the 
set of premises is exclusively derived from the context (including our world 
knowledge) without the help of any indicators within the linguistic expres-
sion. For example, in the utterance The park is some distance from here, the 
expression “some distance” may be developed into ‘quite a long distance’ by 
means of an explicature-generating mechanism called STRENGTHENING. The 
same utterance can be used to warn the hearer that it will take him longer that 
he thought to arrive at the park, or perhaps that it would not be wise to walk to 
the park. These are just two out of a broad range of potential implicatures that 
will vary with the context of the utterance. 
 
For Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez (2002), it is 
possible to derive explicatures on the basis of conceptual mappings. Thus, 
from an expression like You don’t know where you’re going, we obtain the 
explicated proposition ‘The addressee has no clear goals’ on the basis of the 
metaphoric mapping GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. Possible implicatures would 
be, depending on the context, the idea that the addressee is in trouble, that the 
addressee is being warned about his way of doing things, that the speaker is 
complaining about the addressee, etc. In a similar way, a metonymy like The 
sax has the flu, where by “the sax” we refer to ‘the sax player’ (INSTRUMENT 
FOR PLAYER), may be regarded as a way of developing the central explicature 
of the expression. 
 
We may wonder about the stage of the conceptual projection process at 
which explicatures and implicatures occur. Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) has sug-
gested that implicatures are a matter of the blend. This suggestion is in keep-
ing with Turner & Fauconnier’s view of the blend as a dynamic space where 
inferential activity takes place and with the notion of implicature as involving 
the activation of supplementary contextual information. The need to use such 
information would call for the creation of additional input spaces to be pro-
jected into the blend. Consequently, for Ruiz de Mendoza (2002), explica-
tures, which are simply adaptations of the conceptual material initially pro-
vided by the linguistic expression, would fall outside the blend. There are two 
problems with this proposal. One is that it ignores the fact that explicature 
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derivation, as conceived by Sperber & Wilson, is a form of inferential activity 
too. The other is that, as we have argued above, the blend is constructed on 
the basis of previous mental operations, including conceptual projection. 
Meaning implications are worked out before projection takes place. Thus, in 
our own proposal, both explicated and implicated meaning is worked out be-
fore being received by the projection space, where it is integrated with other 
relevant elements in terms of their inherent combinability. 
 
The picture we are trying to draw is more complex than it seems at first 
sight since the derivation of implicatures requires the previous development of 
fully specified propositions (i.e. explicatures) which satisfy the requirements 
of relevance in the context of the utterance. Thus, before we use an utterance 
containing the expression ‘some distance’ as a piece of advice or as a warning 
(an implicature), it is necessary to make “some distance” compatible with the 
context in which it is produced: it may be just one or two miles, or perhaps 
much more (an explicature). In a similar way, before one can interpret the 
metaphor You could see smoke coming out of his ears as, say, a warning to 
beware of the protagonist in certain situations (this is implicated meaning), it 
is necessary to understand that the speaker is talking about a situation in 
which the protagonist is extremely angry, to such an extent that he may lose 





The analysis of the various cases of metaphor-metonymy interaction carried 
out in the previous section, although limited, is enough to understand that 
conceptual interaction tasks are more complex than recognized in the emer-
gent structure hypothesis, but at the same time more clearly regulated by cog-
nitive mechanisms such as domain expansion and domain reduction. Giving 
an adequate explanation of how such mechanisms work endows conceptual 
projection theory with a large degree of parsimony. Note that emergent struc-
ture theorists need to postulate the existence of a dynamic blend which levels 
out inconsistencies simply because they believe that the blend only incorpo-
rates structure which has been correlated in a careful way. In our own hy-
pothesis, Turner & Fauconnier’s blend is replaced by a projection space, 
which is different from other mental spaces, like input spaces, in that it does 
not supply information but receives and combines it. It resembles the other 
spaces, however, in that it is not a dynamic construct. What is dynamic in 
conceptual interaction is the different cognitive mechanisms and operations at 
work between the different spaces involved: on the one hand, we have meta-
phoric and metonymic mappings (i.e. forms of correlation), the latter bringing 
about expansion or reduction operations; on the other hand, we have a projec-
tion operation which exports structure to the projection space. 
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Konceptualna integracija, vrlo raširen konceptualni mehanizam koji su svojom 
teorijom posljednjih nekoliko godina učinili popularnim Mark Turner i Gilles Fau-
connier, očituje se u više područja konceptualizacije, uključujući tu i metaforu i 
metonimiju. Prema toj teoriji, razumijevanje nekih metaforičkih izraza uključuje 
aktiviranje najmanje četiriju različitih mentalnih prostora: dvaja ulaznih (tj. 
izvorišnoga i ciljnoga prostora), generičkog prostora, te integriranog prostora. Turner 
i Fauconnier tvrde da tijekom integracije nastaju strukture koje nisu bile prisutne niti 
u jednom ulaznom prostoru. Te su strukture rezultat određenog broja nepravilnosti u 
procesu preslikavanja, poput asimetrije i nepodudaranja između izvora i cilja. U ovom 
se radu kritički razmatra Turnerova i Fauconnierova teza te se tvrdi da nema 
nepravilnosti u konceptualnoj projekciji. Po našem su viđenju navodne nepravilnosti 
samo prividne te se mogu objasniti pomoću aktiviranja i sustavnom kombinacijom 
djelomičnih izvorišnih i ciljnih ulaznih prostora koji se projiciraju i integriraju u 
jedinstvene složene izvorišne i ciljne prostore. Ti složeni prostori posjeduju sve 
strukturne preduvjete potrebne za metaforičko preslikavanje između domena bez 
ikakvih nepodudaranja ili asimetrija između izvora i cilja. Također tvrdimo da je 
normalna interpretacija izraza koji uključuju konceptualnu projekciju i integraciju 
rezultat djelovanja određenog broja kognitivnih operacija poput korelacije, kontrasta, 
proširenja domene, sužavanja domene, pojačavanje, ublažavanja, zasićenja, te 
zaključivanja o nestvarnim situacijama. Naposljetku, u našem se alternativnom 
modelu pojavljuje projicirani prostor koji je konstruiran na temelju konceptualnih 
struktura koje su rezultat navedenih operacija. Taj je prostor dostupan dodatnim 
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implikativnim operacijama koje su često potrebne kako bi se došlo do konačne 
vrijednosti izraza u kontekstu. 
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ceptualna projekcija, konceptualna integracija, kognitivne operacije, projicirani pros-
tori
 
 
